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In 2007, Mario Caimi published his 2004 Sorbonne lectures on Kant’s Transcendental 
Deduction in French (Caimi 2007). I read it at the time and found it useful in many ways. 
In 2014, an English translation of the revised text, with a new foreword, was published in 
the NAKS series Kantian Questions (Caimi 2014). It is this edition that I shall be 
commenting upon here. Caimi aims to provide an account of the Transcendental 
Deduction  in terms of a ‘line by line’ commentary. In this way, it ‘becomes evident that 1
each step of the Deduction necessarily follows from the preceding step and is grounded in 
it’. Caimi says that ‘[t]he succession of steps is but the unfolding of the Principle of 
Apperception.... the commentary assumes that the entire argument of the Deduction 
consists in a progressive enlargement and enrichment of the Principle of 
Apperception’ (2014:xi).  This is a very profitable approach that I can only endorse. It is 2
unlike any other recent reading of the Deduction.  It takes Kant’s argument in the 3
Deduction to be a progressive one, and it sees the Principle of Apperception as the premise 
of that argument.  
 Though I’m not as enthusiastic as Caimi about Dieter Henrich’s well-known reading 
of Kant’s deduction as modelled after the juridical procedures of Kant’s time (Henrich 
1989), Caimi does maintain, rightly in my view, that ‘that does not mean that the Kantian 
Deduction of 1787 has no logical structure beyond these rhetorical features’; rather, ‘our 
hypothesis of interpretation aims at expounding the Deduction’s argumentative 
structure’ (2014:15). This ties in with my own dual approach to the meaning and structure 
 Earlier, Caimi wrote an excellent paper on the Metaphysical Deduction (Caimi 2000). 1
 Caimi argues for the same in Caimi (2017). I shall occasionally be referring to this latter work, but there 2
are some differences of formulations between the two works. My argument and critique here is oriented to the 
presentation of Caimi (2014). 
 I myself provided a reading that follows a similar path in Schulting (2018). 3
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of the B-Deduction expounded in detail in Schulting (2018). Despite what many think (see 
e.g. Seeberg 2006), the juridical model to which Kant refers in §13 of the Deduction is not 
at odds with seeing the argument in terms of an ostensive proof of sorts.  The argument 4
in the Deduction operates at two separable levels, one more general and the other more 
specific or formal, and both of which are proofs in their characteristic ways that show that 
metaphysical categories are legitimately applied, or used, in judgements of experience 
about empirical objects in the world. This has to do with the old debate about whether 
the structure of the Deduction is regressive or progressive, with one school of 
commentators arguing that it is clearly progressive rather than regressive (e.g. Guyer 
1987), and another arguing precisely the opposite (most prominently Ameriks 1978). No 
one has ever considered the possibility that the answer here might not be either/or, but 
rather both. It’s good to see that Caimi thinks so too, whilst concentrating on the 
progressive nature of the argument.            5
 Caimi’s book has many qualities that I must leave aside here. Across its manageable 
125 pages, it offers a succinct but complete account of the argument of the B-Deduction. 
On some aspects of Caimi’s interpretation I would disagree, and on others I agree or I 
would formulate it differently, which I think is inevitable with such a complex, multifaceted 
text as the Transcendental Deduction. Among many other useful points, Caimi rightly 
stresses that ‘the objective validity of a judgment is not its truth’ (2014:53), as ‘the 
necessary unity expressed by the copula “is” should not be mistaken for a necessary 
connection of the actual predicate of a given judgment with its actual subject term, for the 
connection of the contents of an actual judgment may be contingent—as is the case in 
empirical judgments’ (2014:53). Commentators often confuse objective validity of a 
judgement for its truth value, but this is a mistake. As Caimi rightly says:  
The synthesis according to the necessary unity of apperception (viz. the synthesis 
which has the form of a judgment) allows representations to become possible 
cognitions (that is, it makes it possible that representations be referred to objects) by 
detaching them from mere subjective associations. Through such detachment, 
representations become candidates for cognition, and the judgments that connect 
them may be said to be either true or false.... Thus it would be wrong to interpret 
the necessity of judgment as if it meant that a certain predicate necessarily belonged 
to the concept of a given subject. (2014:54) 
 See my discussion of Seeberg’s arguments in Schulting (2018), ch. 3. 4
 For more on this, see Schulting (2018), ch. 4.5
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The necessity in a judgement, that which makes a unity of representations into an 
objectively valid unity of representations, is not the truth value of a judgement, let alone 
the truth of a judgement. Caimi says:  
What is necessary is that the ground of [the] synthetic connection be the objective 
unity of apperception. This is necessary so that the connection be a connection in the 
object and not just in myself (as an empirical subject). This is necessary even if the 
judgment were false. For even a false judgment belongs to the (possible) experience of 
objects and is not just the passive record of subjective perceptions. (2014:54, emphasis 
added)   6
Of course, one could still contend that objective validity is the truth value of a judgement, 
as do most commentators, just because it concerns both true and false judgements: 
objective validity is to be seen as that aspect inherent in judgement which makes a 
judgement either true or false. But to do so is to misunderstand what objective validity 
means for Kant: it signifies the primordial object-relatedness of a judgement in general 
regardless of whether any arbitrary empirical judgement is true or false.  
 One element—a crucial one I believe—I shall be focusing on here is this: Kant’s 
main claim in the Deduction is that, put very boldly, the fundamental relation between self 
and object is a relation of identity, and that this identity establishes the rightful use of the 
categories in relation to objects of experience since it provides the necessary and (at least 
formally) sufficient condition for this use. The progressive argument in the Deduction is 
supposed to demonstrate this identity. But most commentators think that Kant fails to 
provide a good argument for his claim about any such alleged relation of identity.  
 How can two conceptual and real opposites, self and object, be in any way identical? 
It might be the case that self-consciousness, or, as Kant calls it, transcendental 
apperception, is in some ways a necessary condition for any judging about an object, but 
surely it can’t be the case that, as Caimi notes (2014:32–3), purely ‘because they belong to 
the Self’, in virtue of their ‘integral coexistence’ in the substantial Self, ‘representations 
ha[ve] objectivity’, as Kant still claimed in the Duisburg Nachlass. As Caimi says, 
‘belonging to a self remained a necessary condition of objectivity in the Deduction of 1787, 
but it was no longer a sufficient one’ (2014:33). A new way of explaining had to be found 
as to ‘how those representations which originate in the Self ... “can ... relate ... to 
 See Schulting (2017, 2021). 6
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objects” (B117)’ (2014:33). I happen to think that the argument in the Duisburg Nachlass 
is much less problematic than is often assumed, and that too much is made of the 
ostensibly dogmatic view about the substantial self that Kant presumably still endorsed in 
1775.  But let’s put this issue aside. Caimi, like many others, appears at first to separate 7
the claim about the unity of representations in the Self, who is aware of himself, from any 
objective unity. The former concerns ‘just one condition of objectivity, i.e. that all 
representations must have such a form as to be apt to belong to the Self that possesses 
them ... that all representations must belong to the representing Self’ (2014:33). According 
to Caimi, in this case ‘we have not yet mentioned their reference to objects’ (2014:33). We 
have established only the necessary synthetic unity of the Self’s ‘diverse representations’. ‘It 
could very well be that such a claim would have no consequence for the objects’ (2014:33–
4). It thus seems that, for Caimi too, there is a prima facie gap between the unity of the 
representations of the Self and any objective unity of representations that refers to an 
object, that is, has objective validity. Or put differently, there doesn’t seem to be any 
identity between self and object.   
 But, crucially, Caimi subsequently directs attention to a passage that forms the 
bridge between the argument of §16 and the one in §17, specifically how it is worded. Kant 
writes:  
The supreme principle of the possibility of all intuition in relation to sensibility was, 
according to the Transcendental Aesthetic, that all the manifold of sensibility stand 
under the formal conditions of space and time. The supreme principle of all intuition 
in relation to the understanding is that all the manifold of intuition stand under 
conditions of the original synthetic unity of apperception. All the manifold 
representations of intuition stand under the first principle insofar as they are given to 
us, and under the second insofar as they must be capable of being combined in one 
consciousness; for without that nothing could be thought or cognized through them, 
since the given representations would not have in common the act of apperception, 
the I think, and thereby would not be grasped together in one self-consciousness [in 
einem Selbstbewußtsein]. (B136–7, trans. emended, underlining added) 
Interestingly, according to Caimi, in the sentence that is underlined here ‘a new thought’ is 
introduced, namely, ’the thought of an object’, namely implicitly through two words Kant 
uses: ‘nothing’ and ‘known’. Caimi says that  
 For more detail, see Schulting (2018:65ff.).7
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so far we have remained in the realm of the subject: we have considered its 
receptivity and its spontaneity, the manifold given in intuition, and the synthesis of 
that manifold by means of which it is incorporated [in the French original: s’intègre, 
D.S.] in the unity of the Self. Hereafter, we shall be dealing with knowledge, which 
implies knowing something (as opposed to nothing). To know means to know an 
object. (2014:36, emphasis added)  
If we abstract for the moment from the underlying claim here that there is a transition of 
sorts going on in Kant’s argument, I think the general point Caimi is making here is 
exactly right. The implicit reference in the underlined sentence of B137 is to the knowledge 
of something. In other words, the relatedness to an object, the concept of an object in 
general is already inchoately present. If the counterfactual expression of Kant’s claim (K),  8
i.e. the underlined phrase in the above-quoted passage at B137,  
(K) ‘...[W]ithout that nothing could be thought or cognized through them, since the 
given representations would not have in common the act of apperception, the “I 
think”, and thereby would not be grasped together in one self-consciousness’, 
is reformulated, then we get the following: 
(K*) Something can be thought or cognised through representations only if these 
representations have in common the act of apperception and they are combined 
into one consciousness.   
However, by suggesting that Kant presents here a ‘new thought’, and ‘seems to start the 
entire argument afresh’ (2014:36), and that ‘here we are no longer concerned with the mere 
possession of representations (as modifications of the subject that bears them) [but] 
instead, we are concerned with representations insofar [as] they have a reference to 
something else ... the object’ (2014:37), Caimi seems to be saying that we have moved from 
a discussion of pure subjectivity, the mere possession of the representations, in the 
preceding section of the Deduction (§16), to a wholly different discussion of objectivity in 
the current section (§17). This raises the question of how this sudden transition can be 
explained without begging the question against those who believe that Kant leaves open a 
 One could say that Kant argues here by reductio. 8
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gap between the claim about self-consciousness as the necessary condition of the awareness 
of objects and a claim that self-consciousness is the sufficient condition of such awareness, 
or even the sufficient condition for the objectivity of an object. The standard objection 
against Kant’s reasoning from §16 to §17 is that there is a huge leap from an account of 
self-consciousness to an account of objectivity without so much as providing any 
connecting internal link.  9
 Caimi himself points to such a possible objection (2014:49), but it is not entirely 
clear from his discussion how he believes he can counter it other than by stating that ‘a 
connection of representations is objective insofar as the rule of this connection is the unity 
of apperception (or derives from it), since the connection is then necessary and unavoidable 
(necessity of the connection being an essential feature of its objective validity)’. It seems as 
if Caimi just takes this putatively unaccounted-for logical move at face value. This appears 
to be confirmed by qualifications such as ‘the mere possession of representations (as 
modifications of the subject that bears them)’ and ‘instead we are concerned with 
representations insofar [as] they have a reference to something else’ (2014:37). This 
suggests that the argument in §16 is about the necessary condition of having 
representations simpliciter, indeed about ‘subjective representations’ as ‘distinguishe[d] ... 
from those that have objective referential content’ (2014:37). 
 Caimi proceeds to make a point of the distinction between ways of synthesising 
representations which establish whether representations are either ‘utterly subjective (i.e. 
nothing but modifications of the Self)’ or indeed ‘possess objective validity’. But it seems 
as if Caimi correlates this distinction with the transition between §16 and §17, whereby the 
argument in §16 is supposed to concern merely the way in which representations ‘are 
synthesized either following the same order in which they occur or on a purely associative 
and contingent synthesis’ (2014:37), and by contrast the argument in §17 concerns that 
‘synthesis of those representations that possess objective validity [which] is performed 
according to a rule’. Assuming that this is indeed what Caimi means, it appears he needs 
this contrast to make the argument that Kant presents ‘a new thought’ in §17 that 
presumably shows the transition from subjective to objective representations. The 
transitional passage at the start of §17 doesn’t bridge a putative gap, rather it reinforces 
the contrast between a subject’s representations and representations of an object. But in 
my view the problem with this approach is twofold: 
 For discussion and references, see Schulting (2018:64ff.). 9
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(1) The argument in §16 does not in any way concern the mere subjective, ‘associative and 
contingent’ connection between any and all representations, or indeed the necessary 
conditions for the mere possession of any and all representations by a subject.  
(2) If the argument of §16 were concerned with the purely subjective connection among 
representations or the necessary conditions for the mere possession of them, then it 
would be wholly unintelligible how and by what means there could be a logical 
transition, in the order of reasoning, from such a subjective connection of 
representations to an objectively valid set of representations that ‘purports to be about 
an object’ and is not just a reflection of a subject’s states. The transition to the 
argument about objectivity should be seen as a logical step implied by the previous 
step in the argument and cannot signify a mere contrast with the previous step in the 
argument if indeed, as Caimi claims, the argument should be an ‘unfolding of the 
Principle of Apperception’. 
Ad (1)  
The argument in §16 for the necessary unity among a self’s representations is often read in 
this way.  However, the counterfactual that Kant mentions, and Caimi discusses (2014:27), 10
namely ‘I would have as multicolored, diverse a self as I have representations of which I am 
conscious’ (B134), cannot be associated with ‘this “I” ... fragmented in a plurality of acts 
of consciousness’, as Caimi seems to suggest (2014:27), assuming that he means by ‘this 
“I”’, the ‘I’ of the ‘I think’ of the Grundsatz presented at the start of §16. Misleadingly, 
Kant himself of course uses the pronoun ‘I’ in this very passage at B134. However, strictly 
speaking there wouldn’t be an ‘I’ if it were ‘fragmented in a plurality’ of discrete selves 
since the various, discrete representations wouldn’t in that case have the ‘I’ of the 
accompanying ‘I think’ in common unless of course there were different senses of ‘I’—but 
certainly, it wouldn’t be the ‘I’ that thinks, i.e. the ‘I think’ of the Grundsatz. 
Representations have an ‘I think’ in common if and only if the ‘I think’ accompanies those 
representations.  
 This requires, as Kant argues in §16, that a synthesis among the set of 
representations that are accompanied is carried out: the ‘I think’ accompanies the set of 
representations conjointly (Van Cleve 1999:80), i.e. as synthesised, not separably. I come 
back to this further below. But suppose the ‘I think’ were to be taken to accompany 
representations separably (not an uncommon reading). In that case presumably a 
representation A is accompanied by an ‘I think’1, a representation B is accompanied by an 
 I have discussed such interpretations at length in Schulting (2018), cf. Schulting (2017).10
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‘I think’2, a representation C is accompanied by an ‘I think’3, and so on. In the latter 
putative case of a successive accompaniment of diverse representations by a series of ‘I 
think’s, representations would on that basis never achieve the unity that is a precondition 
of their belonging to one self-consciousness, their being had by an identical thinking ‘I’ (cf. 
Caimi 2017:383). As Kant says, in such a case ‘I would have as multicolored, diverse a self 
[i.e. ‘I think’1, ’I think’2, ‘I think’3, etc.] as I have representations [i.e. representation A, 
representation B, representation C, etc.] of which I am conscious’ (B134). To each 
representation would be attached a different, singular ‘I think’x , but there would never be 
a whole of them with an identical ‘I think’ attached to it. One would just end up with 
another manifold of representations.  
 Given Kant’s argument for the unity of consciousness, such a reading of ‘I think’ 
accompaniment of discrete representations would lead to a regress for there must be a 
further higher-order ‘I think’ which combines the lower-order series of ‘I think’1, ’I think’2, 
‘I think’3, etc. that accompany separately each of the representations into a unity (cf. 
Ameriks 2000:240). But there is no such higher-order ‘I think’: the ‘I think’ is the original 
self-consciousness more original than which there is none; no further ‘I think’ can 
accompany it (B132). Therefore, there are also no lower-order instantiations of the ‘I think’ 
that accompany representations severally. Of course, the analytic unity of consciousness 
means that each of the representations that is contained in this unity has the analytic 
characteristic ‘I think’ that accompanies them, but only if they are combined as having 
this same characteristic.   
 Many commentators read the analytic unity of consciousness, namely the unity of 
representations that share the ‘I think’, which they take to be a mere distributive unity of 
representations in the sense described above, as separable from the original synthetic unity 
of self-consciousness. And presumably, the analytic unity of consciousness holds for any 
relation between various representations, independently of the question concerning the 
original synthetic unity of consciousness. I think this view is mistaken, and have argued 
thus in previous work (Schulting 2017, 2018, 2021). The analytic unity of consciousness 
and the synthetic unity of self-consciousness aren’t separable (though they are of course 
formally distinguished): Kant clearly claims that ‘the analytical unity of apperception is 
only possible under the presupposition of some synthetic one’ or put differently, ‘it is 
possible for me to represent the identity of the consciousness in these representations ... 
only because I can combine a manifold of given representations in one consciousness’ in 
virtue of the synthetic unity of apperception (B134, my underlining). In other words, the 
two types of unity of consciousness are reciprocally conditioning. For representations to 
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share an identical ‘I think’, the sharing of which constitutes their analytic unity, they have 
to have been taken together by the ‘I think’ that they share with each other. This taking 
together is the act of original synthesis or combination. Note that the ‘I think’ is an act of 
spontaneity and is ‘the pure apperception’ or ‘the original apperception’ and ‘an original 
combination [Verbindung]’, as Kant says (B132), so there is no textual evidence for arguing 
that the act of combination and the accompaniment by an ‘I think’ are separable or that 
they are not necessarily relatable capacities or acts unless one, incongruously, were to claim 
that there are two kinds of original combining acts or two kinds of pure apperception.  
 Therefore, there wouldn’t be an analytical unity of consciousness of representations 
if there were no original synthetic-unity of apperception that takes them together, and any 
actual synthetic unity of apperception eo ipso implies an identity among representations 
that is characterised by the analytical unity of consciousness—the latter two (i.e. the 
identity and analytical unity of representations) are in fact equivalent, since the identity of 
the self does not concern a substantial self. 
 This rules out the idea that the ‘I think’ is dispersed among representations that 
wouldn’t have a ‘relation to the identity of the subject’, for there is no more original 
representation ‘I think’ that would accompany these putative discrete, non-identical ‘I 
think’s and combine them into a unity. The subject of thought is identical to the ‘I’ that 
does the thinking, so any representation and any accompanying consciousness that is not 
related to the identity of the subject—it concerns here an ‘empirical consciousness that 
accompanies different representations [and] is by itself dispersed and without relation to 
the identity of the subject’ (B133)—cannot be the ‘I’ that thinks, or an ‘I think’ (as 
defined in the Grundsatz at B131–2). In fact, Kant is clear that the relation to the identity 
of the subject, that is, to the ‘I’ that thinks, ‘does not yet  come about by my 11
 The temporal adverb ‘yet’—the German particle ‘noch’ doesn’t have the temporal connotation—might 11
mislead one into thinking that what is the case here is that first the ‘I think’, as an empirical consciousness, 
accompanies discrete representations presumably in virtue of an analytic unity of apperception, and then in a 
second instance, the relation to the identical subject is established in virtue of the synthetic unity of 
apperception. But this is mistaken as it would then be unintelligible why Kant claims that ‘the analytical 
unity of apperception is only possible under the presupposition of some synthetic one’ (B133, my 
underlining), which means that there can’t be an analytic unity of apperception unless there is a synthetic 
one. The relationship is not temporal, but logical: for there to be an analytical unity of consciousness of 
representations an original synthetic unity of apperception is necessarily presupposed. Where there is no such 
synthetic unity of apperception involved, such as in the case of discrete representations that are severally 
accompanied merely by an empirical consciousness, there is no analytic unity of apperception either, and 
hence no ‘I think’ accompanying those representations. Secondly, if the analytic and synthetic unities of 
apperception were indeed separably instantiatable, and the ‘I think’ were indeed not the identical subject of 
thought, then this would lead to a regress: which synthetic unity unifies the analytic and synthetic unities of 
consciousness so that the relation to the identical subject is established, given that the synthetic unity of 
apperception is already an original synthesis more original than which there is none?      
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accompanying each representation with consciousness’ (B133).  There can’t, logically, be 12
an ‘I think’ that accompanies representations while these representations are at the same 
time not related to the identity of the subject, because this subject and the thinking ‘I’ are 
identical.  
 Of course, Caimi also focuses on the original synthetic unity of consciousness and 
emphasises the reciprocal relation between the analytic and synthetic unities of 
consciousness. But it is not entirely clear to me how he sees the relation between the 
analytic unity of consciousness and the dispersed nature of any arbitrary set of discrete 
representations of which Kant speaks at B133, or indeed whether he supports the idea that 
such a relation exists. If he means that any arbitrary set of representations is united by 
definition in an analytical unity of consciousness, which some of his phrases do suggest, 
then that poses a problem for his claim that the principle of apperception grounds the 
objective unity of apperception since clearly there is an unsurmountable gap between just 
any set of merely subjectively valid representations and the objective unity of apperception 
that is constitutive of objectivity—just as Caimi himself indicates by emphasising the 
contrast between the two. I’d like to hear more about what Caimi thinks about the 
relation, if he thinks it exists, between the analytic unity of consciousness and any set of 
merely subjectively valid representations of which there may  be an empirical 
consciousness.  
 An indication in the direction of an answer can already be gleaned from what Caimi 
says on the transitional section 18 in the B-Deduction, where the objective unity of 
apperception is contradistinguished from the subjective unity of consciousness, ‘which is a 
determination of inner sense, through which that manifold of intuition is empirically given 
for such a combination’ (B139). Caimi says of the representations that are thus 
subjectively united that ‘what accompanies those empirical representations is not the 
universal Self, but the “self” of a singular subject—a “Myself”’ (2014:47). A little later, he 
says that the consciousness that accompanies such representations cannot ‘achieve ... the 
representation of the empirical “myself” and its various states’ (2014:48). This seems to 
confirm that at any rate those representations are not related to the identical ‘I think’, ‘the 
identity of the subject’, just as Kant says in §16 (B133).  
 But the problem here is that Caimi relates this to the discussion in the 
Prolegomena, where Kant still makes a distinction between judgements of perception, 
which are merely subjectively valid, and judgements of experience. However, with Kant’s 
 There is a philosophically relevant distinction—in the literature mostly overlooked—between the use of the 12
determiner ‘each’ at B133 and the determiner ‘all’ at B131. For an explication, see Schulting (2018:144–5, 
229–31).
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new definition of judgement introduced in the B-Deduction, the former distinction cannot 
simply be carried over to the discussion in the B-Deduction.  
 Secondly, Caimi still considers the subjective unity of consciousness to be dependent 
on ‘the universal conditions of unity, especially ... the unity of apperception, upon which 
all unity depends’ (2014:47). This is how he reads an admittedly somewhat cryptic passage 
at B140: 
That [original] unity [of consciousness] alone is objectively valid; the empirical unity 
of apperception, which we are not assessing here, and which is also derived only from 
the former, under given conditions in concreto, has merely subjective validity. (B140) 
If Caimi indeed reads the derived nature of the empirical unity of apperception or 
consciousness in terms of a necessary dependence of it on the transcendental unity of 
apperception (2014:xi, 15), then this creates a problem for his reading of §18 since (1) 
Kant says here that the empirical unity of apperception is not at issue in the Deduction, so 
he can’t mean this derivation—whatever it means—to point to the unity of self-
consciousness as being dependent on the transcendental consciousness, which was discussed 
in §16, since (2) the empirical unity of apperception is a merely contingent unity and (3) 
the representations that are associated in it are not as such necessarily related ‘to the one I 
think’ as Kant says.   13
 Caimi himself confirms that the series of representations in an empirical unity are 
not accompanied by the ‘universal Self’, assuming he means by the latter the original 
thinking ‘I’, or the identical subject of which Kant speaks. I agree, but this implies that 
one can’t maintain that the empirical unity of representations is still necessarily or 
logically dependent on the original unity of apperception such that the original unity of 
apperception or transcendental apperception is a necessary condition for any empirical 
unity of representations simpliciter. Put differently, though the original synthetic unity of 
apperception as a necessary, a priori synthesis is a necessary condition for an objective 
unity of representations that constitutes an object as well as for the identity of a thinking 
self, it is not a necessary condition for a contingent, merely subjectively valid series of 
representations to be that series, i.e. a merely associative series of representations. Caimi 
 One could claim that the transcendental unity of apperception is the necessary form under which the 13
subjective unity of consciousness stands. But stated this way and given that Kant says such a unity has 
merely subjective validity (B140), this would mean, contradictorily, that what establishes a necessary 
synthesis among representations and yields universal validity is the necessary condition for the contingent 
unity of associated representations which don’t have universal validity.  
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often talks about associative or contingent synthesis here, but I think in the Deduction 
Kant reserves the term ‘synthesis’ for the necessary, a priori synthesis that is at issue in 
the argument for the possibility of objectivity and ‘grounds a priori the empirical synthesis’ 
(B140), which yields empirical knowledge. One should not confuse an associative or 
contingent unity of representations with that empirical synthesis, which is always rule-
governed in accordance with an a priori synthesis as its pure form.     
 My view is that the representations in a mere empirical unity of consciousness or 
apperception are indeed those discrete representations referred to in the counterfactual 
statement at B134, to which Caimi earlier also referred, and as such have no relation to 
the identical self, and hence are not representations that share an analytical unity of 
consciousness, i.e. an identical ‘I think’. I have the impression that Caimi’s view comports 
with mine, but I’m not sure, so it would be helpful if he could bring somewhat more clarity 
to his position.     
Ad (2) 
Caimi writes that the rule-governed synthesis that establishes the objective validity of 
one’s representations ‘shows a certain necessity, which is nothing but the necessity by 
which the elements of a concept require one another to build that concept’ (2014:37). It is 
the rule-governed synthesis, in contrast to a synthesis that is ‘just following the mere 
association of thoughts’, that yields objective validity of one’s representations (2014:37), 
whereby ‘objectivity is nothing but the necessity possessed by certain syntheses (2014:39, 
emphasis added). What strikes me as a relevant remark of Caimi’s in this context is that 
he says that ‘the rule furnished by the concept has a necessity of its own’ (emphasis 
added) and that this leads to an ‘independence of that synthetic representation with 
regard to contingent occurrences and the arbitrariness of subjective associations’ (2014:37). 
This suggests that Caimi believes that there are two kinds of necessary synthesis at work, 
which reflect the transition between a merely subjective unity among one’s own 
representations to an objectively valid unity of representations that refers to an object.  
 If I’m correct in assuming this, then this would appear to conflict with the dialectic 
of Kant’s reasoning. Distinguishing between two kinds of necessary synthesis also fails to 
capture the true nature of Kant’s central claim in the Deduction: thought itself is object-
directed, from within itself. Put differently, the very self-reflection on our capacity for 
thought reveals its own objective content, its objectivity or objective validity, namely in 
the way it relates mediately to the object that is immediately given in an intuition, 
through its own act of combining a manifold of given representations. The necessary 
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synthesis that is expressed by an act of thought is the necessary synthesis required for the 
conception of an object; there is no additional synthesis necessary for the possible 
conception of an object. Moreover, if such an additional synthesis were necessary, then we 
would land in a regress: for which additional necessary synthesis is there which synthesises 
the necessary synthesis in thought and the necessary synthesis required for the conception 
of an object such that we have a judgement about an object? The central question here is 
to see that this ‘bridge’ between thought and object lies in thought itself, thought’s own 
combinatory activity.  
 On account of Caimi’s own reading, ‘each step of the Deduction necessarily follows 
from the preceding step and is grounded in it’ (2014:xi).  This means that the argument, 14
in §17, about the necessary synthesis that alone yields objective validity among one’s 
 By contrast with statements in the book we are discussing, in his later article (Caimi 2017), in a comment 14
on Allison’s recent reading of the Deduction (Allison 2015), Caimi seems to be denying that there is a 
logically ‘linear’ route in Kant’s reasoning in the Deduction. But it is not clear how a denial of this relates to 
Caimi’s above-quoted claim that there is an argumentative, even ‘logical’, structure that takes the Principle 
of Apperception as its basis (2014:15). Caimi writes: ‘Ich möchte aber darauf aufmerksam machen, dass die 
im vorliegenden Aufsatz vorgeschlagene Auffassung der Deduktion auf etwas ganz anderes abzielt als eine 
direkte formallogische Ableitung aus dem Apperzeptionsprinzip. Ich möchte die Entwicklung der Deduktion 
aus dem Prinzip der Apperzeption als keine formallogische, sondern als eine solche Folgerung verstanden 
wissen, die durch synthetische Bereicherung des Prinzips vermittelst Zusätzen erfolgt, die im Laufe der 
Beweisführung dem Prinzip hinzugefügt werden. Solche Zusätze werden nicht analytisch gewonnen. Sie 
bereichern das Prinzip durch neue Bestimmungen, die in seiner ursprünglichen Formulierung nicht vorhanden 
sind’ (2017:381n.13). Caimi talks about a ‘strukturellen Aspekt der Beweisführung’ (2017:383), but if the 
argumentative steps are not linked logically, i.e. analytically, as Caimi claims they don’t, then it is hard to 
see what the persuasive, argumentative force is of the ‘additions’ that are supposedly being ‘added’ to the 
starting principle. One would think that in some way ‘[t]he succession of steps’ which is ‘but the unfolding of 
the Principle of Apperception’ must be such that the ‘additions’ that these steps establish must be seen to be 
internally connected to the principle whose elements they unpack; they can’t be arbitrary additions. In other 
words, the process of ‘unfolding’ must have an internal logical structure that demonstrates the probative 
force of the ‘succession of steps’. The subsequent step may show a new insight that was not immediately 
present in the previous step (hence, the emphasis on synthesis), but in order for the steps to constitute a 
coherent deductive argument, the various steps must know an internal logic, and therefore be linked 
analytically. Caimi’s notion of ‘Bereicherung’, or later on the notion of ‘synthetischer 
Vervollständigung’ (2017:383), remains vague. I agree with Caimi that synthesis plays a crucial role in the 
way that the ‘Entwicklung der Deduktion aus dem Prinzip der Apperzeption’ unfolds. While the method may 
be synthetic, the synthetic and analytic unities of apperception are inextricably intertwined, as Kant makes it 
plenty clear in §16. Kant himself says that the principle of apperception itself is analytic, which 
‘explains’ (B135) the synthesis. This interdependence of the formally distinguishable unities of consciousness 
plays out on the level of the argument about apperception and the deduction of the categories itself. The 
synthetic enrichment, as Caimi calls it, is but a teasing out of all the logical implications of the analytic 
principle that is the Grundsatz with which the Deduction proper begins. Otherwise, Caimi cannot explain 
why precisely out of one particular step in the argument the following step follows, or even when one step is 
to be seen as the contrast of the previous step, why this is a necessary contrast; at any rate it then remains 
difficult for him to maintain, as is his main thesis, that the argument is an unfolding of the Principle of 
Apperception. 
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representations must follow from the argument for the synthesis of one’s own 
representations. Indeed, Caimi’s own thesis is that ‘the unity of consciousness is ... the 
uppermost condition of the reference of representations to an object’ (2014:41), i.e. 
objectivity is ‘that synthetic unity which is based upon the necessary unity of 
apperception’ (2014:40). I concur with this.  
 Caimi is right to emphasise the groundedness of objectivity on the ‘fundamental and 
necessary unity expressed by the Principle of Apperception’ (2014:41) and to maintain that 
‘the synthetic unity of consciousness is the condition upon which intuitive representations 
can become objects’ (2014:43). But it is not entirely clear to me how Caimi justifies the 
transition from the ‘other kind’ of necessary synthesis that he appears to suggest is at issue 
in §16, namely one that unites a self’s representations, to the necessary synthesis that 
establishes the objective validity of representations, topic of §17. In his later text (Caimi 
2017) Caimi seems to be saying something different than what is suggested in the book 
under discussion here. The later view is more in line with my reading, namely, the very 
synthesis that establishes the belonging of a manifold of representations to an identical 
subject is the synthesis that constitutes the representation of an object. Caimi says:  
Die notwendige Synthesis ist nun das, worin sich eine objektive Vorstellung (die 
Vorstellung eines Gegenstandes) von einer bloß subjektiven Vorstellung unterscheidet, 
die durch willkürliche Assoziation gewonnen wird. ... Die der Synthesis eigene 
(ursprünglich im „muß“ beim Element B ausgedrückte)  Notwendigkeit erweist sich 15
jetzt als das Merkmal und Kriterium der Objektivität. Die notwendige Handlung des 
Verstandes, durch die alles Mannigfaltige der Vorstellungen unter das ‚Ich denke‘ 
gebracht werden muss, ist dieselbe Handlung, die die Form der Objektivität 
hervorbringt. (Caimi 2017:385, emphasis added) 
I suppose the adjective ‘eigen’ (‘own’ in the earlier quoted English text from 2014:37) 
threw me off course, as it seems to suggest that there are two separable syntheses at work. 
In the German text quoted here, this no longer seems to be the case. The same necessary 
synthesis, i.e. the same act, that brings a manifold of representations under the unity of 
the thinking ‘I’, is the necessary synthesis that produces the form of an object. But as in 
his earlier book Caimi does not offer any detailed argument for stating this identity. 
 As Caimi himself indicates, the argument of the deduction should proceed in terms 
of an analytical procedure of elucidating the understanding and ‘distinguish[ing] its 
 Caimi means with this the verb phrase ‘muß ... begleiten können’ in Kant’s Grundsatz at the start of §16.15
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component parts’.  What is at issue in the Deduction is an ‘analysis of the faculty of 16
understanding itself’ after all (A65/B90). This means that we start out with a first logical 
step, the ‘I think’ Grundsatz with which the deduction proper starts, from which we 
proceed by way of unpacking its necessary, logical implications, or all of the component 
‘elements’ that must be analysed (Caimi justly points to the title of the first part of the 
Critique: ‘Transzendentale Elementarlehre’, A17/B31).  This in turn means that the 17
argument-step arguing for the necessary synthesis that establishes objective validity must 
follow analytically from the argument about the necessary synthesis that unites a self’s 
representations and cannot merely be seen as in contrast with the latter, which would just 
invite the objection about the supposed gap that I talked about earlier.  
 In other words, given the nature of Kant’s proof—a ‘Beweis’ (B145)—the necessary 
synthesis that unites representations so that they have objective reference is, by the logic 
of this proof, nothing but what is already implied in the necessary synthesis that unites a 
self’s representations that is aware of his representations as his own, and can thus be 
teased out by way of analysis. There is an identity between the unitary self and the unity 
that establishes objectivity.  
 To put this differently, the ‘new thought’ that Caimi says is introduced at the start 
of §17, namely the ‘something’ that is ‘the thought of an object’, is implicitly already 
present in the argument for the identity of self-consciousness, and explicitly so in the 
section that is preliminary to the actual deduction argument, namely §15: in §15 Kant 
explicitly indicates that the central argument revolves around the possibility of necessary 
synthesis as an act that is ‘not given through objects’, and that synthesis signifies the fact 
that ‘we can represent nothing as combined in the object without having previously 
combined it ourselves’ (B130, emphasis added); notice the similar formulation as the later 
passage at B137: ‘nothing’ can be thought without being ‘combined’ into a unity of 
consciousness. Objectivity is clearly indicated there, in the preamble of the deduction 
proper, as a function of a priori synthesis, or combination, that is carried out by the 
understanding. The analytical Grundsatz of the ‘I think’ presented at the start of §16 is 
the principle that expresses this synthesis,  as Kant subsequently concludes at the 18
beginning of the second part of §16 (B133 [Ak III: 109.13–15) and somewhat further below, 
 See the interesting points Caimi makes on the aspect of whether Kant follows a synthetical or analytical 16
method in the Critique of Pure Reason at (2014:11–13, esp. 13n.49), and also the historical reference Caimi 
here makes to Kant’s early ’62/’63 work.
 See also A64/B89: ‘This Analytic is the analysis of the entirety of our a priori cognition into the elements 17
of the pure cognition of the understanding’ (A64/B89).
 See also Caimi (2017:382). 18
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at the start of the third paragraph of §16 (Ak III: 110.19–23). This means that the analysis 
of objectivity comes down to, and in fact is nothing but, the analysis of the one a priori 
synthesis. The dialectic is between subject and object from the very start of the 
Transcendental Deduction. 
 The centre of focus throughout is the object-relatedness of thought.  If we go back 19
right to the start of §16, when he introduces the ‘I think’ proposition, it is interesting to 
note—in a similar fashion to Caimi’s remark about the passage at the start of §17—that 
Kant uses the pronoun ‘something’ in the counterfactual statement ‘for otherwise 
something would be represented in me that could not be thought at all’. The possibility at 
issue here is the capacity to think something that is represented in me, which Kant 
subsequently works out in terms of what is presupposed in this capacity (note the 
difference between ‘think’ and ‘represented’).  The ‘I’ or the thinking subject has a 20
necessary relation to its own object, at this point in the analysis still only a minimal 
‘something’ that is the necessary object of thought, an implied thought-content for which 
the ‘I think’ is the necessary form. For one to be able ‘to represent the identity of 
consciousness’ in the manifold representations (the thought-content), a synthesis of these 
representations (a thought-form) is required.  
 What is important in this context is the idea that the identity of consciousness, 
which is the same as the identity of the ‘I think’ that is the shared characteristic of all the 
representations accompanied conjointly by the thinking ‘I’, is equally a consciousness of 
identity, of a something that is the correlate of this identical consciousness: not something 
substantial, not as yet a numerically identifiable object, but a determinate something 
nonetheless. It is the analytically united set of accompanied representations that forms the 
‘something’ that the ‘I’ thinks. It forms the correlate of the thinking ‘I’. That is why Kant 
speaks in the A-Deduction of the ‘transcendental object’. Caimi rightly mentions this 
(2014:40). The transcendental object is the correlate of the ‘transcendental subject’, a 
locution that Kant does not use in the context of the Deduction (only in the Paralogisms 
chapter, e.g. A346/B404 and A355 (Etwas überhaupt).  
 From the start, the ‘possibility of a priori cognition’ is thus the central issue (B132). 
The unity of apperception is the ‘supreme [principle] in the whole of human 
cognition’ (B135). It enables ‘all my determinate thinking’ and then Kant immediately 
 See Brons (2015:74). 19
 Often the ‘I think’ proposition is read in terms of the trivial principle that any representing requires an 20
agent of representation. But this is based on a misreading of what Kant actually says: the principle concerns 
the capacity to think what is represented in one, that is the question of how representations can be thought 
by a higher-order representation. 
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repeats the claim first presented in §15 that ‘combination does not lie in the 
objects’ (B134). This is all still in §16. The transition to §17, which introduces the account 
of cognition (Erkenntnis) as the ‘determinate relation ... to an object’, is the immediate 
corollary of these earlier arguments. In other words, what Kant says in the first paragraph 
of §17, the passage Caimi points to, is not so much a ‘new thought’ as what was already 
indicated, implicitly, in the argument of §16, namely thought’s own object-directedness or 
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